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Recently, Widerker has attacked Fischer's contention that one could use 
Frankfurt-type counterexamples to the principle of alternative possibilities 
to show that even from a libertarian viewpoint an agent might be morally 
responsible for a decision that he could not have avoided. Fischer has 
responded by: (a) arguing that Widerker's criticism presupposes the falsity 
of Molinism and (b) presenting a version of libertarianism which avoids 
Widerker's criticism. Here we argue that: (i) Fischer's first response is 
unconvincing and undermines Molinism itself; (ij) the version of libertari-
anism he presents is fallacious, and (iii) even on the version of libertarian-
ism he proposes, avoid ability remains a necessary condition for moral 
responsibility. 
John Fischer, in "Responsibility and Contro!," puts forth the suggestion 
that an agent might be morally responsible for a decision although he 
could not have avoided making it and further, that even a libertarian 
could agree to this.l To substantiate this claim, Fischer appeals to a ver-
sion of Harry Frankfurt's well-known counterexample to the principle of 
alternative possibilities. In this example we are asked to imagine Jones 
deliberating whether to vote for Reagan or Carter, where he must decide 
to vote for either one or the other. If Jones shows an inclination to decide 
to vote for Carter, then a mechanism installed in his brain, upon detect-
ing that inclination, intervenes and ensures that he decides to vote for 
Reagan nevertheless. If Jones decides on his own to vote for Reagan the 
mechanism remains dormant. Suppose that Jones, unaware of the pres-
ence of the mechanism, decides to vote for Reagan on his own. Fischer 
claims that in this situation Jones is morally responsible for his decision 
to vote for Reagan, even though he could not have decided otherwise. 
Recently, Fischer has defended this claim against David Widerker's 
charge that the unavoidability of Jones' decision is, contrary to Fischer, 
secured by the decision's being causally determined, which would be 
incompatible with libertarianism2 The thrust of Widerker's objection is 
that in order for Fischer's example to be convincing, one must assume that 
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0) Jones' showing an inclination to decide to vote for Carter 
is (in the circumstances) a causally necessary condition for 
his decision to vote for Carter. 
Otherwise, there is the possibility of Jones' deciding to vote for Carter, 
even if a moment earlier he was inclined to decide not to vote for him. 
After all, as libertarians often emphasize, free agents can sometimes 
decide contrary to their inclinations. And in such a case the mechanism 
would not operate. But (1) implies that 
(2) Jones' not having shown an inclination to decide to vote 
for Carter is (in the circumstances) causally sufficient for 
his not deciding to vote for Carter.3 
And since Jones did not actually show an inclination to decide to vote 
for Carter, it follows that there was a sufficient causal condition for his 
decision to vote for Reagan rather than for Carter, i.e., Jones' decision 
was causally determined. This consequence would be unacceptable to 
the libertarian! 
I. Fischer's First Response 
Fischer's first response to Widerker is to accuse him of presupposing 
the falsity of a certain well-known libertarian position, which he calls 
"Molinism," which, when applied to the example under consideration, 
maintains that a) Jones' inclination to vote for Reagan does not causally 
determine his decision to vote for Reagan, and that b) the conditional 
(3) If Jones shows an inclination at T to decide to vote for Reagan 
at T +i, then Jones will decide to vote for Reagan at T +i, 
is rendered true by non-causal facts. 
The Molinist, says Fischer, would counter Widerker's objection that 
Jones has the power to decide otherwise with the following argument: 
[If (3) is true] and given that Jones does in fact show the inclina-
tion at T, then if Jones is able at T +i to decide to vote for Carter, 
he must be able so to act that the past would have been different 
from the way it actually was. This is because Jones' making the 
decision to vote for Carter at T +i would require that Jones not 
have shown the inclination at T to vote for Reagan (emphasis 
ours). But since the libertarian accepts the fixity of the past, he 
will deny that Jones is able at T +i to make a different decision 
from what he actually makes. (Fischer 1995, 121.) 
As we can see, Fischer moves from 
(3) If Jones shows an inclination at T to decide to vote for Reagan 
at T +i, then Jones will decide to vote for Reagan at T +i. 
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to 
(5) If Jones is able to decide at T +i to vote for Carter, then 
he is able so to act that he would not have shown at T an 
inclination to vote for Reagan, 
on the basis of 
(4) Jones' making the decision to vote for Carter requires that 
Jones not have shown an inclination to vote for Reagan, 
and then objects that (5), together with the claim that it is within Jones' 
power to refrain from his decision to vote for Reagan, leads to a viola-
tion of the principle of the fixity of the past. 
What, however, is Fischer's justification for (4)? Is he assuming that in 
the situation under consideration Jones' not having shown an inclination 
to vote for Reagan is a causally necessary condition for his decision to 
vote for Carter? If so, then as Widerker has shown in his paper, Jones' 
actual decision to vote for Reagan would be causally determined, a 
result that would be inconsistent with Molinism. 
Perhaps, however, Fischer takes (4) to be entailed by (3)? Now one way 
he might try to justify this assumption is by construing (4) in terms of 
(4') If Jones had decided to vote for Carter (i.e., had not decid-
ed to vote for Reagan), then Jones would not have shown 
an inclination to vote for Reagan, 
and then by inferring (4') from (3), relying on the rule of contra position. 
This attempt, however, will not work, since this rule is known to be fal-
lacious in the logic of counterfactuals.5 
Alternatively, Fischer's basis for taking (4) to be entailed by (3) may be 
his attributing to (3) a special kind of necessity, call it, "Molinist" necessity.6 
In response to this suggestion we would like to make the following two 
points: First, in order for this proposal to have at least initial plausibility, 
Fischer would have to tell us more about this sort of necessity and how it 
guarantees the inference from (3) to (4) and to (5). Otherwise, the sugges-
tion would seem to be ad hoc. Secondly, even if he were to do this, there 
still remains a fundamental problem with the proposal in that it renders 
Molinism incoherent. To see this, let us consider a situation like the one 
imagined by Fischer, except for the fact that it does not feature a counter-
factual intervener. The Molinist would certainly want to say that in this sit-
uation there is no reason to deny Jones the power to refrain from his deci-
sion to vote for Reagan.? Note, however, that the Molinist would be barred 
from saying this if Fischer's argument from (3) to (5) were sound. For that 
argument could equally serve as a basis for denying Jones the said power 
in this new situation as well." 
II. Fischer's Second Response 
Fischer's second strategy for evading Widerker's critique is to invoke 
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a special sort of libertarian, whose picture of the sequence leading up to 
a decision exhibits both causally determined and non-determined seg-
ments. On the one hand, this libertarian has the agent's best judgment 
causally determining the agent's decision. Thus, the judgment can func-
tion as a sign on which Fischer's intervener may rely in order to ensure 
that the decision he wants is unavoidable. On the other hand, this liber-
tarian posits lack of causal determination in the sequence leading to an 
agent's best judgment. Specifically, he assumes that at least some parts 
of the deliberation process are not causally determined. 
In response, we wish to point out that this libertarian, whatever his 
merits, is certainly not a mainstream libertarian. The latter would reject 
causal determination of a free decision by what immediately precedes it 
in the sequence, even if earlier in the sequence this determination 
lapses." We urge that Fischer's libertarian be renounced, however, on 
grounds other than his eccentricity. For it seems to us that the picture he 
draws of the relation of an agent's best judgment to his decision is mis-
taken. We maintain that in general an agent's decision is not always in 
line with his best judgment. To see this, consider the following example: 
Mona is in a quandary over what to do about Mike. Once again 
he has treated her shabbily, insulted her, deceived her. She 
knows he will come by to apologize today, promise to behave 
himself, ask her to go out with him this evening. She knows she 
will be tempted to forgive him again. She admits that she wants 
to go on seeing him. She realizes, however, that he is incorrigi-
ble. She thinks of all the times she forgave him in the past. Each 
time, she recalls, once the crisis was past, he returned to his for-
mer ways. There is no point in prolonging this relationship, she 
reasons. It will only bring her grief. The best thing to do is to 
send him packing, once and for all. There is no question that 
that is what she should do. The end of the story is predictable. 
The doorbell rings. Mona opens the door and there is Mike with 
a big bouquet of roses. He looks very contrite. Throwing caution 
to the wind, Mona decides then and there to give him another 
chance and invites him in. 
Alfred Mele distinguishes between an agent's evaluation of his reasons 
for an action, and the motivational force of those reasons. 1O The latter, he 
argues, may not be in line with the former. On the theory suggested by 
Mele, Mona judges that her reasons for shutting the door in Mike's face 
are better than her reasons for forgiving him, but her reasons for forgiv-
ing him turn out ultimately to be motivationally stronger. An agent's 
decision, then, need not correspond to his best judgment and by implica-
tion is not deterministically related to it. 
Although we find Fischer's brand of libertarianism untenable, we are 
prepared to engage Fischer on those terms. In Fischer's example, by 
hypothesis, Jones' judgment to vote for Reagan is not causally deter-
mined. If, indeed, we hold him morally responsible for the decision 
which ensues, is it not because he could have formed an alternative best 
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judgment? Fischer disagrees and tries to meet this move by asking us to 
consider the following example: 
... a baby has fallen into a swimming pool in front of you and is in 
immediate danger of drowning. All you have to do is bend over 
and pick the baby up; this would be extremely easy for you, and 
we may suppose that there are no other morally relevant reasons.u 
Fischer claims, if this is a Frankfurt-type situation, then if you decide to 
pick up the baby you are morally responsible for the decision even 
though you could not have decided otherwise. Fischer concedes that 
you could have formed a different best judgment as to what to decide. 
He insists, however, that it is not plausible that this alternative possibili-
ty, the ability "to judge best something for which there are no good rea-
sons," is what grounds your moral responsibility for your decision 
because such a possibility is so trivial.12 
We are sceptical as to whether the sort of possibility Fischer imagines 
is coherent, whether a normal person could judge best something for 
which he sees no good reason. Suppose, however, that the alternative 
possibility in question is that of forming simply a different judgmentY On 
behalf of Fischer's libertarian we stand behind the intuition that it is this 
possibility, trivial though it seems, which is a necessary condition for the 
agent's moral responsibility for deciding to pick up the baby.14 It is the 
presence of this possibility that moves us to view the judgment under the 
aspect of freedom rather than to regard it as forced. IS For consider the 
alternatives. Had the agent not been able to come to a different judgment 
it would be either because the judgment he formed was causally deter-
mined or because it was a random event. In both of these cases, barring 
the possibility of derivative responsibility, the agent would not be moral-
ly responsible for the judgment and hence would not be morally respon-
sible for his decision. Thus the judgment's being avoidable is the only 
alternative which remains for viewing the agent as morally responsible, 
even from the point of view of Fischer's libertarian. In 
Bar-Ilan University 
NOTES 
1. See Fischer 1982, 25-26. 
2. See Fischer 1995 and Widerker 1995. Widerker takes libertarianism to 
be the view that an agent decision's is free in the sense of freedom required 
for moral responsibility only if that decision is not causally determined, and 
the agent could have avoided making it. 
3. For if p is a causally necessary condition for q, then the absence of p 
is a causally sufficient condition for the absence of q. 
4. See Widerker 1995, 114-115. 
5. See Lewis 1973,35-36. 
6. We thank Dale Gottlieb for suggesting this term to us. This interpre-
tation is suggested by Fischer's claim that (3) is rendered true by non-causal 
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facts and his use of 'requires' in (4). On this construal of (3), (4) would fol-
low from (3) by means of contra position. 
7. The standard Molinist position is that an agent acting freely normally 
has this power. See Molina, Disputation 2; and Plantinga 1974, 173-175. 
8. A further criticism by Fischer is the following. Wid erker, on the 
assumption that Jones' decision to vote for Reagan is not causally deter-
mined, suggests that (3) can be construed as a conditional of freedom, i.e., 
(3') If Jones shows an inclination at T to decide to vote for Reagan, 
then Jones will freely decide to vote for Reagan at T +i, 
where 'freely' is understood as implying that Jones could have refrained from 
that decision. Fischer objects, arguing "that one cannot in this context simply 
assume that Jones' freely deciding to vote for Reagan implies that he is free to 
make a different decision." For "part of what is at issue here is whether an 
agent can freely act or decide without being free to do (or decide) otherwise." 
(Fischer 1995, 121.) We think that Fischer is mistaken here. Having rebutted 
Fischer's allegation that Jones' decision to vote for Reagan is unavoidable, the 
libertarian whom Widerker is representing is within his epistemic rights to 
construe (3) in terms of (3') since he has not been given a good reason to the 
contrary. To require, in addition, that he show or prove that in the situation in 
question Jones indeed has this power would be to impose too stringent a stan-
dard of justification. If Fischer thinks that Wid erker' s libertarian is mistaken, 
the burden of proof lies on him to show that. 
9. See Chisholm 1976,62; Ginet 1990, chaps. 5 and 6; Plantinga 1974, 
165-66; and Van Inwagen 1983, 8, 13-15. 
10. See Mele 1984, 370-376. 
11. See Fischer 1995, 124. 
12. Note that this example differs substantially from the examples which 
appear in Fischer 1994, Chapter 7, section 7, where the alternative possibili-
ties which Fischer finds insufficiently robust are ones in which the agent 
does not act freely because he does not act on his own. 
13. Perhaps it may be argued that a normal person with a reasonably 
cultivated moral sense could not have arrived at even a different judgment 
in this case, unless he could have changed his desires and beliefs, which is 
something that in the short range a person cannot do. However, we could 
imagine that the agent is a person who usually takes the easy way out and is 
not very conscientious. In this example he rose to duty, but he had the 
power to come to a different judgement. 
14. Note that the argument that follows is meant to apply whether the 
alternative possibility in question is that of forming a different best judge-
ment or that of forming simply a different judgement. 
15. Cf. Zimmerman 1995, section 2.5. We suggest that the particular 
appeal of Fischer's example derives from its being a case where the agent 
clearly does not deserve moral praise. This should not prejudice the issue of 
moral responsibility, however. 
16. We wish to thank Dale Gottlieb for a helpful discussion of some of 
the issues discussed in this paper. 
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